Strategic complementarity and substitutability without transitive indifference

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the indifference relation(s) need not be transitive. Two results are obtained about the existence of a monotone selection from the best response correspondence when both strategies and parameters form chains. Two more results are obtained about the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where strategy sets are chains, but monotone selections from the best response correspondences need not exist.

Keywords: Strong acyclicity; interval order; single crossing; monotone selection; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-02-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse and nep-gth
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/34866/1/MPRA_paper_34866.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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