The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: This paper extends the prey--predator model of Grossman and Kim (1995) to analyze the relation between the value of the contested rent and the emergence of a conflict. We show that an increase in the value of the rent makes the conflict equilibrium more likely. We also analyze the case where the valuation of the rent is different for the two players. We find, for example, that a conflict equilibrium may occur even though the predator has an important disadvantage in warfare. That's when its valuation of the rent is sufficiently high compare to that of the prey.

Keywords: Conflict-size (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-04
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Published in International Review of Economics 2.56(2009): pp. 163-173

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Related works:
Journal Article: The value of rents and the likelihood of conflicts (2009)
Working Paper: The Value of Rents and the Likelihood of Conflicts (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:15013

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