[go: up one dir, main page]

  EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Two-Stage Allocation Rules

Nils Roehl ()
Additional contact information
Nils Roehl: University of Paderborn

No 1, Working Papers Dissertations from Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics

Abstract: Suppose some individuals are allowed to engage in different groups at the same time and they generate a certain welfare by cooperation. Finding appropriate ways for distributing this welfare is a non-trivial issue. The purpose of this work is to analyze two-stage allocation procedures where first each group receives a share of the welfare which is then, subsequently, distributed among the corresponding members. To study these procedures in a structured way, cooperative games and network games are combined in a general framework by using mathematical hypergraphs. Moreover, several convincing requirements on allocation procedures are discussed and formalized. Thereby it will be shown, for example, that the Position Value and iteratively applying the Myerson Value can be characterized by similar axiomatizations.

Keywords: Allocation Rules; Economic and Social Networks; Hypergraphs; Myerson Value; Position Value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D85 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://groups.uni-paderborn.de/wp-wiwi/RePEc/pdf/dispap/DP01.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pdn:dispap:01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers Dissertations from Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by WP-WiWi-Info ().

 
Page updated 2024-12-25
Handle: RePEc:pdn:dispap:01