Allotment In First-Price Auctions: An Experimental Investigation

Luca Corazzini, Stefano Galavotti (), Rupert Sausgruber and Paola Valbonesi ()

No 153, "Marco Fanno" Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno"

Abstract: We experimentally study the effects of allotment Ð the division of an item into several units Ð in independent private value auctions. In particular, we compare a single-item, first-price auction with two equivalent treatments with allotment: a two-unit discriminatory auction and a setting in which subjects participate in two identical and simultaneous first- price auctions, each involving a single unit. We find that allotment mitigates overbidding, with this effect being more pronounced in the discriminatory auction. In the allotment treatments, most bidders submit different bids for identical units (bid spreading). Across treatments, the discriminatory auction is the least efficient.

Keywords: allotment; multi-unit auction; discriminatory auction; first price auction. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
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Related works:
Journal Article: Allotment in first-price auctions: an experimental investigation (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pad:wpaper:0153

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