Why Do Couples and Singles Save during Retirement? Household Heterogeneity and its Aggregate Implications

Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French, John Jones and Rory McGee

No 28828, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We estimate a model of savings for retired couples and singles who face longevity and medical expense risks, and in which couples can leave bequests both when the first and last spouse dies. We show that saving motives vary by marital status, permanent income, and age. We find that most households save more for medical expenses than for bequests, but that richer households and couples, who hold most of the wealth, save more for bequests. As a result, bequest motives are a key determinant of aggregate retirement wealth.

JEL-codes: D1 D12 D15 E21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-age, nep-cwa, nep-dge and nep-mac
Note: AG PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Why Do Couples and Singles Save during Retirement? Household Heterogeneity and its Aggregate Implications (2023)
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