History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt

No 25073, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Infrequent but turbulent overt sovereign defaults on domestic creditors are a “forgotten history” in Macroeconomics. We propose a heterogeneous-agents model in which the government chooses optimal debt and default on domestic and foreign creditors by balancing distributional incentives v. the social value of debt for self-insurance, liquidity, and risk-sharing. A rich feedback mechanism links debt issuance, the distribution of debt holdings, the default decision, and risk premia. Calibrated to Eurozone data, the model is consistent with key long-run and debt-crisis statistics. Defaults are rare (1.2 percent frequency), and preceded by surging debt and spreads. Debt sells at the risk-free price most of the time, but the government's lack of commitment reduces sustainable debt sharply.

JEL-codes: E44 E6 F34 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-opm
Note: EFG IFM
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Pablo D’Erasmo & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2020. "History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, .

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Journal Article: History remembered: Optimal sovereign default on domestic and external debt (2021)
Working Paper: History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt (2019)
Working Paper: History Remembered: Optimal Sovereign Default on Domestic and External Debt (2018)
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