Majority Choice of Tax Systems in Single- and Multi-Jurisdictional Economies

Stephen Calabrese, Dennis Epple and Richard Romano

No 21231, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We examine majority choice of tax instruments in single- and multi-jurisdictional economies with heterogeneous households. In our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set. We identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments. Equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types. With multiple jurisdictions, strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating. Mobility fundamentally affects the equilibrium tax system with redistribution incentives dominating choice of instruments when mobility is limited. Limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification, public good provision levels, and tax systems.

JEL-codes: H2 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-cdm, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
Note: PE POL
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Published as Calabrese, Stephen & Epple, Dennis & Romano, Richard, 2015. "Majority choice of tax systems in single- and multi-jurisdictional economies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 58-70.

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Journal Article: Majority choice of tax systems in single- and multi-jurisdictional economies (2015)
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