Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More?

Kala Krishna (), Sergey Lychagin and Veronica Frisancho

No 21640, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Placement, both in university and in the civil service, according to performance in competitive exams is the norm in much of the world. Repeat taking of such exams is common despite the private and social costs it imposes. We develop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey's university placement exam. We find that limiting retaking, though individually harmful given the equilibrium, actually increases expected welfare across the board. This result comes from a general equilibrium effect: retakers crowd the market and impose negative spillovers on others by raising acceptance cutoffs.

JEL-codes: C35 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-10
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Published as Kala Krishna & Sergey Lychagin & Veronica Frisancho, 2018. "RETAKING IN HIGH STAKES EXAMS: IS LESS MORE?," International Economic Review, vol 59(2), pages 449-477.

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Related works:
Journal Article: RETAKING IN HIGH STAKES EXAMS: IS LESS MORE? (2018)
Working Paper: Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More? (2016)
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