Testing for Efficient Contracts in Unionized Labour Market
Martyn Andrews and
Alan Harrison
Canadian International Labour Network Working Papers from McMaster University
Abstract:
This paper addresses the design of empirical tests to distinguish between two competing explanations of wage and employment determination in unionized labour markets, the labour- demand and efficient-contract models. We argue that most of the tests employed are restrictive, propose an alternative non-nested approach, a central feature of which is the variation in the set of instrumental variables across the models, and provide an illustration of how it might be implemented, using data from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) 1984 Panel File. The results demonstrate how the traditional approach can lead to inappropriate conclusions, and thereby emphasize the empirical importance of the specification of the instrumental variables.
Keywords: unions; empirical tests; efficient contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/CILN/cilnwp12.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://socserv.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/CILN/cilnwp12.pdf [302 Moved Temporarily]--> https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/rsrch/papers/CILN/cilnwp12.pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Testing for Efficient Contracts in Unionized Labour Markets (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:cilnwp:12
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Canadian International Labour Network Working Papers from McMaster University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().