Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax competition
Andreas Haufler and
Mohammed Mardan
Munich Reprints in Economics from University of Munich, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Following recent court rulings, cross-border loss compensation for multinational firms has become a major policy issue in Europe. This paper analyzes the effects of introducing a coordinated cross-border tax relief in a setting where multinational firms choose the size of a risky investment and host countries non-cooperatively choose tax rates. We show that coordinated cross-border loss compensation may intensify tax competition when, following current international practice, the parent firm's home country bases the tax rebate for a loss-making subsidiary on its own tax rate. In equilibrium, tax revenue losses may thus be even higher than is implied by the direct effect of the reform. In contrast, tax competition is mitigated when the home country bases its loss relief on the tax rate in the subsidiary's host country.
Keywords: Cross-border loss relief; Tax competition; Multinational firms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F23 H25 H32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)
Published in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization C 106(2014): pp. 42-61
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Related works:
Journal Article: Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax competition (2014)
Working Paper: Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax competition (2013)
Working Paper: Cross-Border Loss Offset Can Fuel Tax Competition (2013)
Working Paper: Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax competition (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lmu:muenar:27297
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