Allocating multiple units by sealed-bid auctionsKala Krishna () and Torben Tranaes () No 1998-05, CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics Abstract: This paper studies the allocation and rent distribution between buyers and the seller in multiple units sealed-bid auctions. We restrict attention to the complete information case. A simple diagrammatic exposition of equilibria in the first-price and uniform-price auctions is provided and their equilibria are compared one to another and to the second-price (or Vickrey) auction. We show that the truthful equilibrium in the first-price auction is revenue equivalent to the second-price auction. Both these auctions are discriminatory auctions. We also show that the revenue raised in the truthful equilibrium of the first-price auction is less than that raised in the truthful equilibirum of the uniform-price auction. The approach is also related to a number of themes found more broadly in economics such as the convergence to competition. Keywords: multiple-unit auctions; first-price sealed-bid auctions; revenue equivalence; discriminatory vs. uniform auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuieci:1998-05 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in CIE Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics �ster Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC. |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.