"One man's meat is another man's poison." An experimental study of voluntarily providing public projects that raise mixed feelings

Werner Güth (), Anastasios Koukoumelis and Maria Levati
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Anastasios Koukoumelis: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Postal: Kahlaische Straße 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany

No 2011-034, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: We compare, on the basis of a procedurally fair "provision point" mechanism, bids for a public project from which some gain and some lose with bids for a less efficient public project from which all gain. In the main treatment, participants independently decide which one, if any, of the public projects should be implemented. We also run control treatments where only one of the two projects can be implemented. We find that (a) mixed feelings per se do not affect bidding behavior, and (b) the provision frequency of the project that raises mixed feelings declines significantly when it faces competition from the public good.

Keywords: Public project; Bidding behavior; Procedural fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D63 H44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-08-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-034

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