On the Evolution of Preferences

No 2011-032, Jena Economics Research Papers from Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena

Abstract: A common feature of the literature on the evolution of preferences is that evolution favors nonmaterialistic preferences only if preference types are observable at least to some degree. We argue that this result is due to the assumption that in each state of the evolutionary dynamics some Bayesian Nash equilibrium is played. We show that under unobservability of preference types, conditional on selecting some self-confirming equilibrium as a rule for mapping preference into behavior, non-selfish preferences may be evolutionarily successful.

Keywords: evolution of preferences; altruism; learning; self-confirming equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 D64 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-07-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-edu, nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-hme, nep-hpe and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-032

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