Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium

No 2947, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: The paper presents a general equilibrium model of search unemployment that incorporates absence from work as a distinct labor force state. Absenteeism is driven by random shocks to the value of leisure that are private information to the workers. Firms maximize profits while recognizing that the compensation package may affect the queue of job applicants and the absence rate. The analysis provides results concerning the effects of social insurance benefits and other determinants of workers’ and firms’ behavior. The normative anlysis identifies externalities associated with firm-provided sick pay and examines the welfare implications of alternative policies.

Keywords: unemployment; search; absenteeism; social insurance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J21 J64 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2007-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-dge and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published - published in: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 2007, 109 (3), 439-467,

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https://docs.iza.org/dp2947.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium* (2007)
Working Paper: Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium (2005)
Working Paper: Worker Absenteeism in Search Equilibrium (2005)
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