Can Active Labor Market Policy Be Counter-Productive?

No 8551, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Abstract: We study active labor market policies (ALMP) in a matching model. ALMPs are modelled as a subsidy to job search. Workers differ in their productivity, and search takes place along an extensive margin. An additional job seeker affects the quality of unemployed workers. As a result, the Hosios conditions are no longer valid. To replicate the optimum the worker share in bargaining must exceed the Hosios level, and one must impose a tax on job search activity. The coalition in favor of ALMP is also studied.

Keywords: active labor market policy; matching models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 J6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2014-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-lab, nep-lma and nep-mac
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published - published in: Research in Economics, 2015, 69 (1), 26-36

Downloads: (external link)
https://docs.iza.org/dp8551.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2015)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
Working Paper: Can active labor market policy be counter-productive? (2014)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8551

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA) IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Holger Hinte ().