To Introduce or Not To Introduce Monetary Bonuses: The Cost of Repealing Teacher Incentives

Yusuke Jinnai
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Yusuke Jinnai: International Univeristy of Japan

No EMS_2016_08, Working Papers from Research Institute, International University of Japan

Abstract: Teacher performance pay programs form the foundation of recent reforms in public education. Although existing research has found monetary bonuses for teachers increase student achievement, no studies have examined the potentially negative effects of repealing such incentives. Using novel data from North Carolina, where the state government first reduced and finally repealed its teacher incentive program, this paper shows that student achievement at the lowest-performing schools significantly decreased after the reduction in bonuses and further decreased after the repeal of the incentive program. These findings illustrate that once incentives are introduced it is not cost-free to reduce or remove them.

Keywords: School accountability; Performance pay; Teacher incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H4 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2016-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu and nep-ure
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