How much should you own? Cross-ownership and privatization

Rupayan Pal

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers from Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Abstract: This paper examines the interdependence of cross-ownership and level of privatization in case of differentiated products mixed duopoly. It shows that it is optimal for the private firm not to own any (own the entire) portion of the privatized share of its rival firm, if the level of privatization is very low (very high). In equilibrium, the government makes sure that cross-ownership is not attracted. However, in most of the situations, the possibility of cross-ownership adversely affects the prospect of privatization. Results of this paper have strong implications to antitrust regulations and divestment policies.

Keywords: Cross-ownership; mixed duopoly; partial privatization; product differentiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 H42 L13 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cis and nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: How much should you own? Cross-ownership and privatization (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ind:igiwpp:2010-015

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