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Arm's length relationships without moral hazard

Jacques Crémer ()

No 585, IDEI Working Papers from Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse

Abstract: I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information.

Date: 2009-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
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http://idei.fr/sites/default/files/medias/doc/by/cremer_j/arms.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Arm's-Length Relationships without Moral Hazard (2010) Downloads
Working Paper: Arm's length relationships without moral hazard (2009) Downloads
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ide:wpaper:21623

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