Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces

Jean-François Mertens, Abraham Neyman () and Dinah Rosenberg

Discussion Paper Series from The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem

Abstract: We prove that games with absorbing states with compact action sets have a value.

Keywords: Games; Stochastic Games; Zero-sum; Minimax; Absorbing States; Value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2007-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces (2007)
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