THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID
Wolfgang Meyer and
Pascalis Raimondos ()
Additional contact information
Wolfgang Meyer: University of Cincinnati, Postal: Department of Economics, University of Cincinnaty
No 04-1999, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics
Abstract:
Why do donor countries give foreign aid? The answers found in the literature are:
(i) because donor countries care for recipient countries (e.g. altruism), and/or (ii)
because there exist distortions that make the indirect gains from foreign aid (e.g.
terms of trade effects) to be larger than the direct losses. This paper proposes a
third answer to the above question, namely that aid is determined through the
domestic political process of the donor country. The paper demonstrates how
foreign aid affects the donor country’s income distribution and how, in a direct
democracy, the majority of voters might benefit from foreign aid giving even
though the country’s social welfare is reduced.
Keywords: foreign aid; politics; majority voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F35 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1999-03-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pke
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://openarchive.cbs.dk/cbsweb/handle/10398/7488 (application/pdf)
Full text not avaiable
Related works:
Working Paper: The Politics of Foreign Aid
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:1999_004
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics, Porcelaenshaven 16 A. 1.floor, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CBS Library Research Registration Team ().