CEO Turnovers and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Copenhagen Stock Exchange

Robert Neumann and Torben Voetmann
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Robert Neumann: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Postal: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, A5, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark

No 1999-10, Working Papers from Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance

Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between performance and CEO turnovers using

a sample of 81 turnovers and 81 matching companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock

Exchange. We find that poor performance increases the probability of management

replacements and that forced layoffs are value-increasing events while voluntary

resignations are value-decreasing events. Institutional investors as active monitors, or

part of corporate control, are not exhibited in the analysis of CEO turnovers. If

institutional investors have any influence on CEO turnovers, then it is not revealed in

our data. But, the results suggest that institutional investors' equity holdings tend to

protect managers from replacement.

Keywords: CEO Turnovers; Corporate Governance; Ownership Structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G14 G23 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2001-05-17
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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