Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment

Performance relative de deux méchanismes incitatifs simple: expérimentation pour un bien public

Juergen Bracht, Charles Figuieres and Marisa Ratto
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Juergen Bracht: University of Aberdeen
Marisa Ratto: Policy Studies Institute - Partenaires INRAE

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Abstract: We compare the performance of two incentive mechanisms in public goods experiments. One mechanism, the Falkinger mechanism, rewards and penalizes agents for deviations from the average contributions to the public good (Falkinger mechanism). The other, the compensation mecha- nism, allows agents to subsidize the other agents. contributions (compen- sation mechanism). It is found that both mechanisms lead to an increase in the level of contributions to the public goods. However, the Falkinger mechanism predicts the average level of contributions more reliably than the compensation mechanism.

Keywords: public goods; volontary provision; incentive mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.inrae.fr/hal-02658682
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Published in Journal of Public Economics, 2008, 92 (1-2), pp.54-90. ⟨10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.005⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public goods experiment (2008)
Working Paper: Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment (2004)
Working Paper: Relative performance of two simple incentive mechanisms in a public good experiment (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02658682

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.005

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