An Experimental Study of an Over-the-Counter Market

Giuseppe Attanasi, Samuele Centorrino and Ivan Moscati
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Ivan Moscati: Uninsubria - Universitá degli Studi dell’Insubria = University of Insubria [Varese]

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Abstract: We study an electronic over-the-counter (OTC) market, in which each agent looks for the best counterpart through bilateral negotiations. We compare its performance with the standard electronic double-auction (DA) market, in which traders post their quotes publicly. We show that the lack of information in the OTC market induces an efficiency loss, characterized by an average closing price below the competitive price and by a traded quantity below the competitive quantity. We further test the robustness of these findings when exogenous shocks modify the competitive equilibrium. Among other things, we show that supply shocks increasing the competitive quantity improve OTC's efficiency.

Keywords: Market experiments; Over-the-counter market; Double auction; Private vs public information; Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2016, 63, pp.22-35. ⟨10.1016/j.socec.2016.03.003⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01721851

DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2016.03.003

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