Formal and informal job search

Abstract: I develop a model where workers decide how hard to look for a job via formal and informal search channels. The intensity of formal search determines an individual's arrival rate of offers. The strength of investment in informal search translates into a job contact network in which job offers are transmitted. There are two equilibria, one with high formal search and one with high informal search. The former Pareto dominates the latter.

Keywords: Unemployment; Job search; Endogenous job contact networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Published in Economics Letters, 2014, 125 (3), ⟨10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.008⟩

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Journal Article: Formal and informal job search (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01263747

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.008

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