Game Dynamics and Nash Equilibria

Abstract: If a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, then this equilibrium is arguably the solution of the game from the refinement's literature point of view. However, it might be that for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; replicator dynamics; best-reply dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-07
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00756096
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Published in Journal of Dynamics and Games, 2014, pp.537-553

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