The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria

Abstract: It is shown that, under the replicator dynamics, all strategies played in correlated equilibrium may be eliminated, so that only strategies with zero marginal probability in all correlated equilibria survive. This occurs in particular in a family of 4×4 games built by adding a strategy to a Rock-Paper-Scissors game.

Keywords: Replicator dynamics; Correlated equilibrium; Rock-Paper-Scissors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Published in Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 59, pp.397-407. ⟨10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00664293

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.09.001

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