Geometry, Correlated Equilibria and Zero-Sum Games

Abstract: This paper is concerned both with the comparative geometry of Nash and correlated equilibria, and with a generalization of zero-sum games based on correlated equilibria. The set of correlated equilibrium distributions of any finite game in strategic form is a polytope, which contains the Nash equilibria. I characterize the class of games such that this polytope (if not a singleton) contains a Nash equilibrium in its relative interior. This class of games, though not defined by some antagonistic property, is shown to include and generalize two-player zero-sum games.

Keywords: Zero-sum games; Correlated equilibria; Geometry; Jeux à somme nulle; Equilibres corrélés; Géométrie (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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