Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium: Elimination of All Strategies in the Support of Correlated Equilibria

Yannick Viossat

Working Papers from HAL

Abstract: We present a family of games for which, under the replicator dynamics and from an open set of initial conditions, all strategies used in correlated equilibrium are eliminated.

Date: 2005
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242977
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