Replicator Dynamics and Correlated Equilibrium

Abstract: This note establishes that in every 3-3 symmetric game, the replicator dynamics eliminates all strategies that are never used in correlated equilibrium. This extends to the best-response dynamics and to any convex monotonic dynamics. The proof is based on dual reduction.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; Game-dynamics; Dual reduction; Equilibre corrélé; Dynamiques de jeux; Réduction duale (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00242953
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