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The state and class discipline: European labour market policy after the financial crisis

Charles Umney, Ian Greer, Ozlem Onaran and Graham Symon

No 17464, Greenwich Papers in Political Economy from University of Greenwich, Greenwich Political Economy Research Centre

Abstract: This paper looks at two related labour market policies that have persisted and even proliferated across Europe both before and after the financial crisis: wage restraint, and punitive workfare programmes. It asks why these policies, despite their weak empirical records, have been so durable. Moving beyond comparative-institutionalist explanations which emphasise institutional stickiness, it draws on Marxist and Kaleckian ideas around the concept of ‘class discipline’. It argues that under financialisation, the need for states to implement policies that discipline the working class is intensified, even if these policies do little to enable (and may even counteract) future stability. Wage restraint and punitive active labour market policies are two examples of such measures. Moreover, this disciplinary impetus has subverted and marginalised regulatory labour market institutions, rather than being embedded within them.

Keywords: financialisation; policy systems; wage restraint; active labour market policies; workfare; Marxism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hme
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Capital and Class 2.42(2017): pp. 333-351

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http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/17464/5/17464%20ON ... _Discipline_2017.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: The state and class discipline: European labour market policy after the financial crisis (2015) Downloads
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