Worker Directors: A German Product that Didn’t Export?John Addison and Claus Schnabel No 2009-02, GEMF Working Papers from GEMF, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra Abstract: Despite its seeming lack of attractiveness to other countries, the German system of quasi-parity codetermination at company level has thus far held up fairly well. We recount the theoretical arguments for and against this form of codetermination, and survey the evolving empirical evidence as to its economic impact. Even if theory and the more recent empirical findings hold out the prospect that the apparatus of good corporate governance might include employee representation on company boards, caveats attach to the extent of representation and the composition of the worker side. But even if the entity has performed better than its external reputation might indicate, it is clearly in the process of adapting to change. In particular, the availability of alternative forms of corporate governance will increasingly shape the German institution. Keywords: codetermination; worker directors; board-level employee representation; firm performance; legal arbitrage; Germany (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gmf:wpaper:2009-02 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in GEMF Working Papers from GEMF, Faculty of Economics, University of Coimbra Contact information at EDIRC. |
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