Do We Need a Mechanism for Solving Sovereign Debt Crises? A Rule-Based Discussion

Ugo Panizza

No 03-2013, IHEID Working Papers from Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies

Abstract: This paper uses the rules of engineering as a rhetorical device to discuss why the international financial architecture needs a structured mechanism for dealing with sovereign insolvency. The paper suggests that the most important problem with the statusquo relates to delayed defaults and sketches a proposal aimed at mitigating this problem.

Keywords: Sovereign debt; Sovereign default (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F34 H63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2013-02-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-cwa
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:gii:giihei:heidwp03-2013

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