Zero-Sum Games

O. Nomia

Papiers d'Economie Mathématique et Applications from Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Abstract: We introduce here zero-sum games, which represent the strategic interactions where two agents have totally opposed interests. The concept of rational solution for such interactions is then defined by the notions of value and optimal strategies. These quantities always exist if the information is perfect (there is no uncertainty) and the number of stages of the interaction is bounded.

Keywords: GAMES; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:pariem:97.30

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