Vertical Restraints in the European Automobile Industry

Tommy Gabrielsen and Lars Sørgard ()

Working Papers from Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-

Abstract: New regulation for the EU automobile industry allows dealers to engage in multifranchise operation, a practice that formerly could be prohibited by the producers in this market. We argue that a likely consequence of thsi shift in regulatory regime is increased dealer concentration. This will tend to lower wholesale prices as producers must compete more intensely to get access to the dealers. On the other hand, dealers will gain local market power which tend to raise retail prices.

Keywords: AUTOMOBILES; MARKETS; REGULATIONS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L42 L62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:norgee:13/97

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration- NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, HELLEVEIEN 30, 5035 BERGEN SANDVIKEN NORWAY.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Krichel ().