Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Players Games

Charles Figuieres, P. Garderes and F. Rychen

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: In economic two players games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash Equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule has to be amended if the game features strategic substituability.

Keywords: INVESTMENTS; GAMES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D43 D61 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 1998
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Related works:
Journal Article: Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Player Games (2011)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in a class of two-player games (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:98a03

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