Infrastructures publiques et politiques de developpement decentralisees

Charles Figuieres, P Garderes and F Rychen

G.R.E.Q.A.M. from Universite Aix-Marseille III

Abstract: We consider a capital accumulation game between two different jurisdictions. When the jurisdictions adopt open loop strategies, we study the inefficiency of the steady state Nash equilibrium with respect to the steady state utilitarian solution.

Keywords: GAMES; ECONOMIC MODELS; GOVERNMENT; INFRASTRUCTURE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 H54 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Infrastructures publiques et politiques de développement décentralisées (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:aixmeq:97a16

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