Central bank institutional structure and effective central banking: cross-country empirical evidence
Iftekhar Hasan () and
Loretta Mester
No 08-5, Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the legal and institutional frameworks governing central banks and financial market regulatory authorities throughout the world have undergone significant changes. This has created new interest in better understanding the roles played by organizational structures, accountability, and transparency, in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of central banks in achieving their objectives and ultimately yielding better economic outcomes. Although much has been written pointing out the potential role institutional form can play in central bank performance, little empirical work has been done to investigate the hypothesis that institution form is related to performance. This paper attempts to help fill this void.
Keywords: Banks and banking; Central (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/frbp/asset ... pers/2008/wp08-5.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden
Related works:
Journal Article: Central Bank Institutional Structure and Effective Central Banking: Cross-Country Empirical Evidence (2008)
Working Paper: Central bank institutional structure and effective central banking: cross-country empirical evidence (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fip:fedpwp:08-5
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working Papers from Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Beth Paul ().