Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in a Two-Dimensional International Environmental Model

Marc Germain, Henry Tulkens and Alphonse Magnus
Additional contact information
Marc Germain: Universite catholique de Louvain
Alphonse Magnus: Institut de mathématique, Université catholique de Louvain

No 2009.26, Working Papers from Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei

Abstract: This article deals with cooperation issues in international pollution problems in a two di- mensional dynamic framework implied by the accumulation of the pollutant and of the capital goods. Assuming that countries do reevaluate at each period the advantages to cooperate or not given the current stocks of pollutant and capital, and under the assumption that damage cost functions are linear, we define at each period of time a transfer scheme between countries, which makes cooperation better for each of them than non-cooperation. This transfer scheme is also strategically stable in the sense that it discourages partial coalitions.

Keywords: Stock Pollutant; Capital Accumulation; International Environmental Agreements; Dynamic Core Solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F42 F53 O21 Q54 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model (2010)
Working Paper: Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model (2010)
Working Paper: Dynamic Core-Theoretic Cooperation in a Two-Dimensional International Environmental Model (2009)
Working Paper: Dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in a two-dimensional international environmental model (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.26

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