Explanation and Misrepresentation in the LaboratoryLucy Ackert, Bryan K. Church and Ping Zhang No 2006-25, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University Abstract: We report the results of an experiment designed to examine the effect of opportunity to provide an explanation for inaccurate results and predictability of behavior on managersâ?? reporting bias and investorsâ?? ability to decipher the bias. We conduct 20 experimental sessions, each comprised of one manager and three or four investors. The manager has an incentive, in general, to inflate investorsâ?? expectations and investors have an incentive to accurately predict value. We find that the manager reports with an upward bias a majority of the time. The magnitude of the bias, however, is lessened considerably when the managerâ??s reporting behavior is unpredictable and the manager has an opportunity to explain inaccurate (biased) reports. The data suggest that under such conditions the manager seeks to avoid reporting inaccurately and having to choose an explanation. We also find that investors adapt to the managerâ??s behavior and, strikingly, anticipate that explanation dampens reporting bias. Pages: 41 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2006-25 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University Contact information at EDIRC. |
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