Recruitment and selection in organizationsLSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library Abstract: This paper studies employer recruitment and selection of job applicants when productivity is match-specific. Job-seekers have private, noisy assessments of their match value and the firm performs noisy interviews. Job-seekers' willingness to undergo a costly hiring process will depend both on the wage paid and on the perceived likelihood of being hired, while a noisy interview leads the firm to consider the quality of the applicant pool when setting hiring standards. I characterize job-seekers' equilibrium application decision as well as the firm's equilibrium wage and hiring rule. I show that changes in the informativeness of job-seekers assessments, or changes in the informativeness of the firm's interview, affect the size and composition of the applicant pool, and can raise hiring costs when it dissuades applications. As a result, the firm may actually favor noisier interviews, or prefer to face applicants that are less certain of their person-job/organization fit. Keywords: hiring; recruitment; selection; employer search. (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:58673 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library LSE Library Portugal Street London, WC2A 2HD, U.K.. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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