The Fiscal Multiplier and Spillover in a Global Liquidity Trap
Ippei Fujiwara and
Kozo Ueda
CAMA Working Papers from Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University
Abstract:
We consider the fiscal multiplier and spillover in an environment in which two countries are caught simultaneously in a liquidity trap. Using a standard New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) model, an optimizing two-country sticky price model, we show that the fiscal multiplier and spillover are contrary to those predicted in textbook economics. For the country with government expenditure, the fiscal multiplier exceeds one, the currency depreciates, and the terms of trade worsen. The fiscal spillover is negative if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one and positive if the parameter is greater than one. Incomplete stabilization of marginal costs due to the existence of the zero lower bound is a crucial factor in understanding the effects of fiscal policy in open economies.
JEL-codes: E52 E62 E63 F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2012-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Journal Article: The fiscal multiplier and spillover in a global liquidity trap (2013)
Working Paper: The fiscal multiplier and spillover in a global liquidity trap (2010)
Working Paper: The Fiscal Multiplier and Spillover in a Global Liquidity Trap (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:een:camaaa:2012-17
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