Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities

Matteo Triossi and María Haydée Fonseca-Mairena ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Eduardo M.R.A. Engel

No 345, Documentos de Trabajo from Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile

Abstract: We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents on one side of the market to reveal their preferences. However, the stable correspondence is implementable in Nash equilibrium. Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D62, D78. Key words: Marriage market with externalities; Incentives; Implementation.

Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lam and nep-ppm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Journal Article: Incentives and implementation in marriage markets with externalities (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:edj:ceauch:345

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