Claim, offer and information in wage bargaining

Jaume Garcia Villar and Sergi Jimenez-Martin

UC3M Working papers. Economics from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Abstract: A stylized private-information model on the determination of the initial works council claim and the initial firm (counter) offer is analyzed in the context of the Spanish Collective Bargaining system. The Spanish system forces agents to make initial offers at the beginning ot the negotiation process. Thus initial firm offers are expected to reveal very little information. Our findings confirm such a guess. Morever, we found that initial offers crucially depend on aggregate bargaining conditions, price expectations and those variables that reflect the characteristics of the negotiation unit. However, the latter set of variables enters differently in both offer equations.

Keywords: Claim; Offer; Collective; bargaining; Wage; Panel; data (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-01
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cte:werepe:4138

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