The Corporate Governance of Defined-Benefit Pension Plans: Evidence from the United Kingdom

Cocco, Joâo F. and Paolo Volpin

No 4932, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper studies the governance of defined-benefit pension plans in the United Kingdom. We construct a governance measure, equal to the proportion of trustees of the pension plan who are also executive directors of the sponsoring company. Our findings indicate that pension plans of indebted companies with a higher proportion of insider-trustees: (i) invest a higher proportion of the pension plan assets into equities, (ii) contribute less into the pension plan, and (iii) have a larger dividend payout ratio. This evidence supports an agency view, whereby insider-trustees act in the interest of shareholders of the sponsoring company, and not necessarily pension plan members.

Keywords: Defined benefits; Pension plans; Insiders; Corporate governance; Pension trustees (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G23 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-eec and nep-fin
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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