Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-Offenses Approach

Tanguy van Ypersele, Louis Hotte () and Fabrice Valognes

No 3782, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We propose a market-for-offenses model of property crime, which explicitly accounts for protection expenditures among heterogeneous individuals. The crime equilibrium is modeled as a free-access equilibrium in which the match between criminals and victims equates the average returns to crime. We borrow from the literature on the economics of conflicts in order to define an appropriation function that combines the efforts of criminals with the protection efforts of the victims. The supply and demand for crime are endogenized taking into account incentives to participate in criminal activities and individual protection decisions. The effects of changes in public enforcement, redistribution policies and economic development are analyzed, as well as the distribution of the burden of crime among heterogeneous individuals.

Keywords: Crime; Private protection; Public enforcement; Economic development; Inequality; Redistibution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D74 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-02
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Working Paper: Property Crime with Private Protection: A Market-for-Offenses Approach (2009)
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