International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities

Markus Brunnermeier and Yuliy Sannikov

No 10339, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: This paper develops a dynamic two-country neoclassical stochastic growth model with incomplete markets. Short-term credit flows can be excessive and reverse suddenly. The equilibrium outcome is constrained inefficient due to pecuniary externalities. First, an undercapitalized country borrows too much since each firm does not internalize that an increase in production capacity undermines their output price, worsening their terms of trade. From an ex-ante perspective each firm undermines the natural ?terms of trade hedge.? Second, sudden stops and fire sales lead to sharp price drops of illiquid capital. Capital controls or domestic macro-prudential measures that limit short-term borrowing can improve welfare.

Keywords: Hot money; International capital flows; International credit flows; Pecuniary externalities; Sudden stops; Terms of trade hedge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F33 F34 F36 F38 F41 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-ifn and nep-opm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (55)

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Related works:
Journal Article: International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities (2015)
Working Paper: International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities (2015)
Working Paper: International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities (2014)
Chapter: International Credit Flows and Pecuniary Externalities (2013)
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