Constitutions and Order: A theory and comparative evidence from Colombia and the United States

Leopoldo Fergusson, Javier Mejia, James A. Robinson () and Santiago Torres ()
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James A. Robinson: University of Chicago, Harris School of Public Policy and Department of Political Science
Santiago Torres: The Pearson Institute, Harris School of Public Policy, University of Chicago,

No 20815, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: We propose a framework to explain why some societies may end up with different constitutional solutions to the problem of maintaining order in the face of self-interested behavior. Though the salient intellectual tradition since Hobbes has focused on how institutional design is used to eradicate violence, our framework illustrates that equilibrium constitutions may in fact have to deliberately allow for violence. This arises because some societies are unable to use institutions to influence income distribution. In this case, a constitutional tolerance of violence emerges as a credible way for an incumbent to meet the participation constraint of a challenger. We illustrate the results with the comparative constitutional history of the US and Colombia.

Keywords: Order; Constitutions; Violence; Institutions. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D74 H19 P00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2023-08-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:020815

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