Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment

Loukas Balafoutas, Marco Faravelli and Roman Sheremeta ()
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Roman Sheremeta: Case Western University, Weatherhead School of Management, Department of Economics

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We conduct a field experiment on conflict in swimming pools. When all lanes are occupied, an actor joins the least crowded lane and asks one of the swimmers to move to another lane. The lane represents a contested scarce resource. We vary the actor’s valuation (high and low) for the good through the message they deliver. Also, we take advantage of the natural variation in the number of swimmers to proxy for their valuation. Consistent with theoretical predictions, a swimmer’s propensity to engage in conflict increases in scarcity (incentive effect) and decreases in the actor’s valuation (discouragement effect). We complement the results with survey evidence.

Keywords: conflict; conflict resolution; field experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C93 D74 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-isf
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/353/

Related works:
Journal Article: Conflict in the pool: A field experiment (2023)
Working Paper: Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:21-16

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