Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions

Theresa Fahrenberger and Hans Gersbach

No 2198, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects where the first-period project may have a long-lasting impact. In the first period a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting only voting losers keep the voting right in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.

Keywords: voting; minority; durable decision; risk aversion; tyranny of majority rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Minority voting and long-term decisions (2010)
Working Paper: Minority Voting and Long-term Decisions (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2198

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