The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox

Wolfgang Eggert and Martin Kolmar ()

No 1074, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper examines information sharing between governments in an optimal taxation framework. We present a taxonomy of alternative systems of international capital income taxation and characterize the choice of tax rates and information exchange. The model reproduces the conclusion of the previous literature that integration of international capital markets may lead to the under-provision of publicly provided goods. However, contrary to the existing literature under-provision occurs because of inefficiently coordinated expectations. We show that there exists a second equilibrium with an efficient level of public good provision and complete and voluntary information exchange between national tax authorities.

Keywords: tax competition; information exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-fin, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax‐competition Paradox (2004)
Working Paper: The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1074

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